Thursday, April 17, 2008

Are Forgiveness and Justice Incompatible?

Consider the following propositions:
(1) We should always treat others justly.
(2) We should always forgive others for their wrong-doings.
(3) If we forgive someone, we do not treat them justly.
Each of these propositions seems intuitively correct, but they also seem to form an inconsistent set. (1) and (3) entail the denial of (2); (2) and (3) entail the denial of (1). It seems we can only accept at most 2 of the 3 propositions.
Let's call the acceptance of (1) and (3) RETRIBUTIONISM.
Let's call the acceptance of (2) and (3) ANTI-RETRIBUTIONISM.
Do either of these two view seem attractive to the Christian? Retributionism implies that we should not forgive people when they wrong us or others. Everyone, all the time, should reap what they sow. Anti-retributionism implies that we should always forgive people when they wrong us or others. Wrong actions should never be punished and justice is an out-dated, draconian concept. Neither of these seems wholly satisfying.
Can we somehow reconcile the three propositions? Let's call the acceptance of (1) and (2) the HARMONY VIEW. Now two questions arise: (a) does this entail the denial of (3)? and (b) does this commit us to a logical contradiction or at least an incoherence?
Let's look at the first question. Does the conjunction of (1) and (2) entail the denial of (3)? It does if we define 'justice' in a certain way. The common sense understanding of justice seems to be 'returning like with like," or "treating equals equally and unequals unequally." But perhaps justice is a richer concept than this and refers instead to a way of always treating people in the appropriate way. There are two ways we could go at this point: (i) we could say that the just person knows how to respond to each person on a case-by-case basis -- sometimes retribution and sometimes absolution; or (ii) we could say that forgiving someone of their wrong-doing does not preclude the prospect of punishing them. It seems that (i) won't work, because the conjunction of (1) and (2) demands that we always forgive and always act justly. It simply won't do to say that we may sometimes do one or the other. What about (ii)? This seems the most promising way to harmonize forgiveness and justice.
Consider an illustration. Smith has assaulted Jones and injured him. Smith is apprehended by the authorities, and brought before Jones and a judge. Smith decides that, in order to obey the command of Christ, he must forgive Jones and give up any moral claim against him. However, Smith also believes that the best thing for Jones would be to spend time in jail in order to help him face the consequences of his actions and see his need for change. (Is this too naive?) So, Smith may will both forgiveness and justice (in the legal sense) toward Jones.
So this kind of proposal suggests that the Harmony View does not entail the denial of (3), which answers our first question (a). It also seems to give a felicitous answer to the second question (b) and avoids any logical incoherence. (This is because justice, as defined above, does not preclude forgiveness.)
Whether or not this works, it seems that there should be some way to harmonize (1) and (2), because I think Christianity contains both of these principles. As followers of Jesus, I think we have strong intuitions in both directions. Perhaps my proposed harmonization is a good starting point for this project. Are there passages of Scripture that would provide insight? (I'm sure theologians have written tomes on this topic, but I'm new to it.)

Labels: , ,

Saturday, April 12, 2008

Is Friendship Selfish?

Consider the following two statements:
(A) All friendships are fueled solely by self-interest.
(B) There are some frienships, virtuous friendships, which are motivated by a mutual desire to promote the interests of the other.

(A) and (B) cannot both be true, can they?

I think that (A) certainly has some intuitive pull. Let me give two reasons we might accept it. First, it seems true that all our actions and pursuits, including friendships, are ultimately fueled by a desire for our own happiness. Suppose you are currently reading this blog. Why are you reading it? You might say, "In order to become wise." (Purely hypothetical.) Then I can ask why you want to become wise. You might say, "Because it will help me make better choices." Why do you want to do that? "Because then I will be happier*." Why do you want to be happy? There is no answer to that question that cannot in turn be analyzed in terms of happiness (or shalom). You can ask a series of "whys" about any action you perform, and it will lead to the same final answer: in order to be happy. So, (A) seems true in that sense.

Second, (A) seems true because this is exactly the type of reasoning that is often (implicitly) employed in discussing the importance of friendship. Consider the benefits of friendship cited in the Bible:

(1) Friends can help me in times of need. (Eccl. 4:9-12 suggests this sort of reason.)
(2) I can learn from my friends and become a better person. (Prov. 27:17 points this out -- "as iron sharpens iron")
(3) I am less likely to perform bad actions (and more likely to do good) when I am with my friends. (This is the idea of Heb. 10:24-25)
(4) I take pleasure in the company of my friend. (Just as Jonathan delighted in David, 1Sam. 19:1)

Perhaps there are other, more altruistic, reasons given in the Scriptures for pursuing friendship, but I will leave that to my readers to explore.

So (A) seems to have some reasons in its favor. But I think it is impossible to deny (B). We all have either seen examples of or experienced virtuous friendship. David and Jonathan seem to be a paradigm case, even considering the "delight" that was involved. Jesus talks of a man laying down his life for his friends. Surely such an act could not be motivated by self-interest. So how do we solve the puzzle? It would be simple to reject (A), and yet it seems to have some truth in it. For the sake of argument, let's postpone the rejection of (A) and try a different path.

Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, Book IX, chapter 9 suggests a potential strategy for reconciling the two claims (A and B). Aristotle proposes that when we are in a close friendship, our friend is really a second self. How do we make sense of such a claim? Richard Kraut, in Aristotle and the Human Good, suggests that we might think of this in terms of our friends actions and our friends fortunes. Aristotle may mean that when we have a profound influence over the formation of another's character, their actions become, in an extended sense, our own. He may also mean that a friend's good or bad fortune is also our good or bad fortune, by extension. When we consider the connection and influence between a parent and a child, this seems plausible. And while it is not quite as clear with regard to friends, we can still conceive of how such a connection might work.

So how does this help us? Well, suppose that my friend is really a second self, and that his good is therefore my good. Thus, when I promote his interests, I promote my own. So, (A) can be true, and yet I may very well have unselfish motives for promoting the interests of my friend. It just turns out that in loving my friend, I am in fact loving myself. Is this sort of deep metaphysical connection between friends plausible?

As an illustration from Scripture, take David and Jonathan (again). It says that Jonathan was immediately struck with David on their first meeting: "When David had finished speaking to Saul, the soul of Jonathan was bound to the soul of David, and Jonathan loved him as his own soul." (1 Sam 18:1) Later the authorwrites that Jonathan loved David "as he loved his own life." (20:4) This sort of soul-joining language seems similar to what Aristotle has in mind, even though this passage suggests that such a bond can be formed rather quickly. Similar language is used elsewhere: in Genesis 2, speaking of the intimate relationship between a husband and wife; in Romans 12 and 1Cor. 12 speaking of the bond between believers.

So not only do we see the "extended self" idea in Scripture, but we also see the sorts of moral implications suggested by Aristotle. Reflecting on the Genesis 2 passage, the apostle Paul says "so husbands ought also to love their own wives as their own bodies. He who loves his own wife loves himself; for no one ever hated his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes is, just as Christ does the church, because we are members of His body." (Eph. 4:28-30) So, in a sense, Christ's love for the church is also self-interested! However, Christ is not selfish in loving the church (love is not selfish!). Thus, it seems that husbands are not selfish in loving their wives, and friends are not acting selfishly in pursuing frienships of virtue. So both (A) and (B) can be true at the same time with regard to the same individual.

Does this solution seem plausible?
* When I use the term 'happy,' I am refering to the classical sense of the word. In our culture, it has come to mean something like "experiencing pleasure" or some superficial concept of that sort. I take happiness to be analagous to the concept of "blessedness" Jesus referred to in the Sermon on the Mount.

Labels: , ,

Wednesday, March 26, 2008

Bible Services

Here's my first ever attempt at a screen play. Inspired by the earlier post on the "worst sermon ever."

[Scene 1: Small, store-front church; preacher railing on and on about the evils of something or other, saliva flying; citing crazy number theory as proof of his view, intermittently wiping brow with dingy hankerchief. *Camera work reminscent of a comedic, documentary-style like "The Office."]

Enter Man and Woman (abruptly), dressed Scully and Mulder-esque. They stand at the back of the boxy, utilitarian room (lined with cheap paneling) until the preacher stops to notice them.

Preacher: Can I help you?
Man: Are you Rev. Smoot?
Preacher: That's right.
Man: We're with Bible Services. (Flash badges) Is that your Bible there on the pulpit?
Preacher: You bet it is!
Man: I'm afraid the Bible is going to have to come with us.
(Gasps from the motley congregation.)
Preacher: Scuse me?
(Man walks forward briskly, reaches toward Bible. Preacher snatches it defiantly, his eyes wide.)
Man: We don't want any trouble, Rev. Smoot. Just let us take the Bible. It will be perfectly safe.
Preacher: What in tarnation are you doin'? This is MY Bible and ain't no one takin it nowhere!
(Scullyish woman approaches, displaying document.)
Woman: We have a warrant, Reverend. There have been reports of Bible abuse.
Preacher: Huh?
Man: Bible abuse. I'm sorry sir, but if you don't let the Bible come with us peacefully, the officers outside will place you under arrest, and you'll end up losing your Bible anyway.
Preacher: (mouth hanging open, slowly hands Bible to Man) W-w-what are you going to do with it?
Man: The Bible will go to a foster home until we can set a court date. It will be perfectly fine. Don't worry.
Woman: Do you have any other Bibles?
Preacher: In my study.
Woman: Please show me. All your Bibles will have to come with us.
(Woman and preacher exit)
Man: (turning to congregation) I'm very sorry for the interruption ladies and gentlemen. Please continue your worship. Your preacher will need to fill out some paperwork while we process the Bibles, but I'm sure he'd want you to carry on. Have a nice day.
(Man walks down the isle, exits.)
(Congregation sits in silence, looking around at each other. Cut to commercial.)

Labels: , ,

Thursday, March 13, 2008

Strange Bedfellows? Bill Bright and St. Augustine

Here's a short, insightful post by theologian Fred Sanders that gives ol' Bill some much-needed theological vindication. I think what Sanders shows is what Bill and Augustine already knew: 'simple' is not always 'simplistic.'

Labels:

Friday, March 07, 2008

Could This Be the Worst Sermon Ever?

This is why we need a bar exam for ministers. I wasn't sure whether to laugh, cry or cuss. Forget the problem of evil -- how about the problem of bad sermons? To be fair, this is just the last few minutes of the message. I'm sure the first 20 minutes were rife with coherency, reason and displays of hermeneutical acumen.

HT: A Thinker's Progress

Labels: ,

Wednesday, March 05, 2008

Does God Speak To People?

We frequently hear Christians say things like, "God spoke to me" or "I sensed God saying to me . . ." or "I'm learning to hear God's voice" or "We need to listen to God." We often pray for an answer to a specific question, expecting that God will, in some way, give us a specific answer. Are these ways of talking based on bad theology?

What would it mean for God to speak to me? In cases of human communication, a simple model involves four parts: sender, message, medium and receiver. On this simple model, God is the sender, the message is various and I am the receiver. But what is the medium? There seem to be several possible answers to this question.

If God does "speak" to humans, there are several means or mediums by which God might do so. First, we see in the Bible cases where it appears that God spoke in an audible voice with human language. For instance, the prophen Habakkuk writes that "the LORD answered me and said, 'Record the vision and inscribe it on tablets . . .'" Of course, it is possible that God spoke directly to his mind and bypassed the ears altogether. I'm not sure it matters, though. The important thing to note is that the "speaking" was linguistic and readily understandable. I would also include dreams and visions in this category. The instances I am referring to are not just vague "feelings" or "senses" that God was saying something, but clear linguistic communication.

Second, God speaks through the medium of written language. Certainly God's Word is, indirectly, God speaking. God has brought it about that his intentions, commands, thoughts, etc. are communicated to us by means of written language. This is perhaps the easiest medium to accept.

Third, I think God speaks to believers intuitively. By this I mean to capture things like impressions during prayer, or when God speaks personally through the Word. When we experience intuitive communication, we sometimes say that we have a sense of God's leading or his direction on a matter. We don't hear or see any language, but we just know. Sometimes this is called tacit knowing. You may not know how you know, but you just know. Perhaps an example of this is in Acts when the elders of the church said that "it seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us . . ."

Fourth, God can speak to us through other people. This one is akin to the first, since it generally involves hearing an audible voice, but not God's voice. It is a linguistic and propositional form of communication. The prophets are good examples of this type, as are angels. God once got his message across to Balam by means of a donkey! Recall, though, that it was the donkey's words, not God being "channeled" through the donkey.

Fifth, I think God can speak to us through circumstances or through creation. "Dat to day pours forth speech, and night to night reveals knowledge." (Ps. 19) This is metaphorical, but the idea is that God is attempting to say something by means of creation. There is content. They tell of the glory of God. My favorite example is Jonah and the vine. God causes the vine to grow and perish overnight in order to get a message across to Jonah. The vine was not the message, but it was meant to get his attention and reveal to him the dark places in his soul. God may also "close a door" or cause some other event that is meant to signal his desire for us.

So, all these examples are well and good, but does God still speak to us today, as he did in the Bible? I think the answer has to be "yes," but with one caveat. The content of God's message in the act of communication is almost always going to be of a certain sort. Let's distinguish between two kinds of information or message-content that God might transmit to us. I will call the first "gnostic" information and the second "biblical" (you can see where this is going). Most people are wary of "speaking" talk because of abuses that generally involve gnostic information. What I mean by "gnostic" is secret, privileged information that God gives to a very limited number of persons. Gnostic information consists of propositions that are not contained in, nor can be inferred from the Bible. In fact, they may even be contrary to the Bible. Moreover, gnostic information is allegedly given to one person or a small group of people. I do not believe that God speaks in this way, with very few exceptions.

Biblical information, on the other hand, is intended to be public, consistent with and very often echoing Scripture. Paul's conclusion in the dispute over the communicative gifts is this: "Let all things be done for edification." God's speaking to a person should not be considered strictly a private matter, but ultimately for the building up of the body as a whole community. I am extremely skeptical of any alleged "divine message," the content of which is something that no Christian could ever have known or discerned apart from the revelation of the message. That is, I believe that when God speaks, he will simply be recapitulating what he has already said, in one way or another. This is what the entire ministry of the Old Testament prophets consisted in. They simply recapitulated or rehashed the Mosaic law and covenant, with all its promises and warnings.

So, I probably have not said enough here to draw a sound conclusion. More distinctions need to be drawn, more terms defined, more Scriptures explored. That will be for a later post. Of course, if I get absolutely no comments on this, I won't be terribly motivated to write more. I'll let the "free market" decide.

Labels: , ,

Tuesday, February 19, 2008

A Definition of Prayer

What is prayer? Simone Weil's definition is one of the more intriguing ones I've come across. I'll put it in a philosophical format. I'll call her definition the "Attention Thesis" (AT).

(AT) A subject S is praying if and only if S's attention is oriented toward God.
Is this an adequate definition? First let's get clear on an important term: attention. First, attention refers to an intentional mental state in which a person chooses to make some particular thing the object of his thought. When I choose to watch the second hand of my clock move, my attention is on the movement of the second hand. I am attending to the movement of the second hand. When I choose to imagine a cube in my mind, I am attending to the image of the cube. When I choose to think about the concept of humility, I am attending to that concept. If a thought pops into my head involuntarily, or if an insect flies across my visual field, I may notice or see it, but I am not attending to it.

Second, attenting is an action, it is something we choose to do. I cannot give my attention to something without doing so on purpose. In the case of the insect, once I have noticed it I may then choose to direct my attention to it.

Now there is an important difference between attending a thing and attending to my concept of a thing. To attend to a thing is not merely to think about it, put to pay attention to it. I cannot pay attention to the Mona Lisa if I am not in the Louvre. I can attend to my memory of it, or my concept of it, but not the thing itself. Thus, in the case of persons, I do not think we can pay attention to someone who is not present or engaged in communication with us. And even if the person is present, attention is more than merely looking at them or hearing them. We see this phenomenologically with human communication. It is possible to hear what a person says with out paying attention to them. We all know the difference, and we consider ourselves slighted when our interlocutor fails to pay attention to us in an important conversation.

So given this understanding of attention, how does AT hold up? Well, let's break it into two pieces.
(AT1) S is praying only if S's attention is oriented toward God.
(AT2) S's attention is oriented toward God only if S is praying.

To refute AT, we must show that either AT1 or AT2 is false by way of a counter-example. Can we think of a counter-example for AT1? Is there a scenario where someone is praying (to God), and yet their attention is not oriented toward God? Consdier the following: Smith is reciting the daily prayers prescribed by his church, and yet he is thinking about a report he must give at the office on Monday. Smith's attention is on his report. Is Smith praying? Intuitively, no.

Now, one might object by claiming that God's hearing a person's prayer-like words is sufficient for prayer to occur. I.e., a person can perform an utterance of certain prayer-like words ("deliver me O, Lord") without any thought of God whatsoever, and God will count that as a legitimate request. But consider the following case. Brown is watching a football game on TV. Black, who has recently committed an egregious wrong against Brown, enters the room, sits down and begins to watch the game. Brown says, "Aren't you going to apologize?" A few minutes later, Black utters the phrase, "I'm sorry," all the while gazing intently at the TV. Does this count as an apology? If not, then neither does a mere prayer-like utterance count as prayer. If someone would defend this as a legitimate apology, then I don't know what to say to them.

So then, it seems that AT1 stands up to our brief inquiry. But what of AT2? Can we imagine a counter-example where someone is focusing their thought upon God, and yet is not praying? this seems less clear. In fact, this is the key to Weil's view of prayer. She thinks any such attention would count as an act of prayer.

One objection to AT2 might go like this: I can think about God without praying in the same way that I can think of my wife without talking to her. But as I have already pointed out, thinking about a person is not necessarily the same as paying attention to them. If my wife is in Rome, and I am in Kansas City, and we are not communicating in any way, then thinking about her amounts to thinking about my memory of her or my idea of her (I am pining for her). If my wife is before me, and I am thinking of her while looking at her intently, then I am attending to her. Can I do this without any communication whatsoever? That seems unlikely, given the significance of body language, facial expression, etc. Just the mere fact that I am paying attention to her so intently communicates something, e.g., adoration or anger. I am bound to give away my thoughts by looking at her in a certain way, or being silent.

So if attending to a human being in this manner makes it extrememly likely that communication is occurring, then attending to God in this manner entails that prayer is occurring. This is because God can know my very thoughts. And if, ex hypothesi, I am thinking about him, his knowing my thoughts amounts to communication, i.e., prayer. So AT2 seems true.

Given the truth of AT1 and AT2, it follows that AT itself is true. Thus, Weil's definition stands. This is only my first pass at a philosophical treatment of prayer, so comments are appreciated.

Labels: , ,

Sunday, January 20, 2008

Tight-laced Evangelicals, Miracles, and the Lord's Supper

My short experience as a Christian (compared to some) has mostly been with the tight-laced sort. We don't get too excited (like the Charismatics do), and we aren't superstitious (like the Roman Catholics tend to be). Worship is engaging, but you won't see any dancing, tambourine-waving ladies down front. We accept the miraculous, but we don't look for the Blessed Virgin in our spaghetti dinner. I don't mean to be uncharitable to these other traditions -- I'm just enjoying a bit of fun at their expense.

In the last two years, however, my family has been worshipping at a more liturgical church. You would think that Presbyterians are as tight-laced as they come, but surprisingly, I've found the stereo-type to be off the mark. Our church has actually helped us become more open to the idea of the miraculous. I.e., our laces are loosening, but not in the charismatic sense. I've become more receptive to the idea of supernatural activity during worship, but primarily within the event of the eucharist, and perhaps in the liturgy itself.

Now, as a card-carrying, tight-laced evangelical (TLE), I have always held the respectable view of the Lord's Supper -- the Memorial View. Nothing magical, nothing mystical, just a symbol. Grace comes to us through the word and prayer, not bread and grape juice. But this is being challenged. In our new church, we celebrate the Lord's Table every week (with fresh bread and really cheap wine). Could it be that something more is passing into my soul than physical nutrients? (I'll explore this scripturally in a future post.) I'm open to this idea.

Now, in the midst of all this, I've observed something interesting about myself, and perhaps other tight-laced evangelicals as well. Have you ever noticed who it is that fights tooth and nail to defend the historical (and future) miracles of the Bible (even those that are not widely accepted)? That's right, TLEs. Ironic, isn't it? Or is it? My hypothesis is this: TLEs will battle to the death to defend the miracles of the past (and future), because we have no miracles of the present. Other traditions don't have as much to lose if it turns out that the universe is billions of years old, or if the sun didn't actually "stand still" for Joshua. They witness the miraculous every Sunday.

Any thoughts from fellow TLEs?

Labels: ,